Uzun zamandır üzerinde çalıştığım makalemi sonunda bitirebildim. Şu anda değerlendirme aşamasında olduğu için tamamını buraya koyamıyorum ancak sunumumdan sonra sizlerle de paylaşarak görüşlerinizi almak isterim. Şu aşamada sadece makalenin giriş kısmını verip konu ile ilgili literatürü sizlerle paylaşacağım.
“How big is the smallest fish in the pond?
You catch one hundred fishes, all of which are
greater than six inches. Does this evidence
support the hypothesis that no fish in the pond
is much less than six inches long?
Not if your net can’t catch smaller fish.
Knowledge about limitations of your data collection
process affects what inferences you can draw from the data.”
Almost all undergraduate students have some difficulties to understand the principles of game theory on the first hand and even if they understand there is always a big ‘question mark’ whether human decisions and interactions occur in the same way game theory predicts. There is no sharp answer to this question simply saying ‘no’ or ‘yes’. But many researchers showed that human decisions in a strategic manner have been effected by many variables which also lead them to give decisions closer to the theoretical predictions of game theory.
Experimental economics is one of the well established way to test the game theoretical predictions with human subjects.
Aim of this paper is to analyse the guessing games, also the well known name p-beauty contest games, by the results of experimental studies.
First chapter will give a theoretical approach to the guessing game and also will give the game theoretical solution of the well known “basic” guessing game as an example.
Second chapter will focus on the experimental studies with their contributions and critiques to the theory.
Third and the last chapter will be a discussion chapter mainly for the next generation experiments and for new ideas which can improve the structure and lead other researchers to think further on it.
Bu işe birkaç makale ile başlamışken; hem konunun hoşuma gitmesi ve hem de 3. bölüm için düşündüğüm fikirlerin hayata geçirilip geçirilmediği konusunda emin olmak için literatürün tamamına hakim olmam gerektiğine karar verdim ve karşıma aşağıdaki liste çıktı. Bu listeye, konuyla doğrudan ilişkili olmadığı için Costa Gomes’in çalışması eklenmemiştir. Yine Morone’nin aynı seriden 17 numaralı çalışma metni de benzer gerekçelerle dışarıda tutulmuştur.
Tahmin Oyunları – Makale ve Çalışma Metinleri dahil bir liste;
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Duffy, John and Nagel, Rosemarie, “On the robustness of behaviour in experimental ‘beauty contest’ games”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, November 1997
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Morone, Andrea and Morone, Piergiuseppe, “Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can We Learn?” , S.E.R.I.E.S. Working Paper No:15, 2006
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Nagel, Rosemarie, Bosch-Domènech, Antoni, Satorra Albert and García-Montalvo, Jose, “One, Two, (Three), Infinity: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments”, Working paper, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, 2001
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